David Tate puts the difference between the different kind of bad guys in A’stan quite bluntly:

…the coalition are fighting two distinct insurgencies in Afghanistan. The first, that keeps those in Regional Command South busy, is certainly a primarily Pashtun-led insurgency that is nationalist and religiously based to an extreme. However, there are also drug dealers, foreigners and criminals also well represented.

In Regional Command East, not only are you dealing with Pashtun nationalists, but wahabbi extremists, islamic revolutionaries, timber barons, drug smuglers, al Qaeda operatives, nationalists, opportunists and, of course, Taliban.

Point is, there are dozens of groups with dozens of issues loosely operating together in a fluidity of rivalry, opportunity and convenience and they are NOT all Taliban [X]

And David to suggest we label the bad guys, all flavors of them, as AGF, for Anti Government Forces.

Qui d’autre que la patrie du capitalisme pouvait produire un ouvrage aussi clair, sur comment obtenir son objectif pour moins cher et sans que cela coute des vies ? En achetant l’adversaire plutôt qu’en achetant des munitions pour le contraindre ?
réponse dans le Handbook 09-27 du Center for Army Lessons Learned:

Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System Handbook